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Abstract
We model the behavior of three agent classes acting dynamically in a limit order book
of a financial asset. Namely, we consider market makers (MM), high-frequency trading (HFT)
firms, and institutional brokers (IB). Given a prior dynamic of the order book, similar to the one
considered in the Queue-Reactive models [12, 18, 19], the MM and the HFT define their trading
strategy by optimizing the expected utility of terminal wealth, while the IB has a prescheduled
task to sell or buy many shares of the considered asset. We derive the variational partial
differential equations that characterize the value functions of the MM and HFT and explain
how almost optimal control can be deduced from them. We then provide a first illustration of
the interactions that can take place between these different market participants by simulating
the dynamic of an order book in which each of them plays his own (optimal) strategy.
Key words: Optimal trading, market impact, optimal control.
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1 Introduction
The comprehension of the order book dynamic has become a fundamental issue for all market par-
ticipants and for regulators that try to increase the market transparency and efficiency. A deep
understanding of the order book dynamic and agents behaviors enables: market makers to en-
sure liquidity provision at cheaper prices, high-frequency traders to reduce arbitrage opportunities,
investors to reduce their transaction costs, policy makers to design relevant rules, to strengthen mar-
ket transparency and to reduce market manipulation. Moreover, modeling the order book provides
insights on the behavior of the price at larger time scales since the price formation process starts
at the order book level, see e.g. [11] for Brownian diffusion asymptotic of rescaled price processes.
Recently, the widespread market electronification has facilitated the access of high quality data de-
scribing market participants decisions and interactions at the finest time scale, on which statistics
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can be based. The availability of the order book data certainly allows a better understanding of the
market activity. On the other hand, the recent market fragmentation and the increase of trading
frequency rise the complexity of agents actions and interactions.
The main objective of the present paper is to propose a flexible order book dynamics model
close to the one of [12, 18, 19, 23], construct a first building block towards a realistic order book
modeling, and try to better understand the various regimes related to the presence of different
market participants. Instead of considering a pure statistical dynamics as in e.g. [12], we construct
a structural endogenous dynamics, see e.g. [22, 23], based on the optimal behavior of agents that
are assumed to be rational. For numerical tractability, we simplify the market in three classes of
(most significant) participants: the market makers (MM), the high-frequency trading (HFT) firms,
and the institutional brokers (IB). Each of them decides of his policy in an optimal way, given prior
statistics, and then interact with the others given the endogenous realizations of the market.
More precisely, we postulate that they assume an order book model similar to the one suggested
by the Queue-Reactive model [18], see also [1, 12, 17], in which we restrict to the best bid and ask
queues1: limit and aggressive orders arrive with certain intensities, when a queue is depleted it is
regenerated according to a certain law and possibly after a price move, the spread can take two
different values2. Importantly, we also take the order book’s imbalance into account in the modeling
of the different transition probabilities, see e.g. Besson et al. [9].
The market participants can either put limit or aggressive orders. The aim of a market maker
is to gain the spread. He should therefore essentially put limit orders, aggressive orders being used
when his inventory is too unbalanced. In our model, he can only acts on the given order book.
The high-frequency trader is assumed to play on the correlation between the order book dynamics,
viewed as the stock price, and the price of another asset, called futures hereafter. Indeed, he
believes that the difference between the stock and the futures prices is mean-reverting. Whenever
he buys/sells one unit of the stock, he sells/buys back one unit of the futures. We do not handle
the order book associated to the futures but simply model the price of the futures as the mid-price
of the stock to which a mean-reverting process is added. Still, we introduce a (possibly equal to 0)
transaction cost proportional to the size of the transaction. As the market-makers, he seeks for a
zero inventory at the end of the trading period. Finally, institutional brokers are simply assumed
to play VWAP (Volume Weighted Average Price)- or Volume-based strategies (trading algorithms).
Again, they essentially use limit orders and become aggressive when they are too late in their
schedule.
We focus on the derivation of the optimal strategies of the market makers and the high-frequency
traders, and on how they can be computed numerically by solving the associated variational partial
differential equations. Note that it is important to consider their strategies within a dynamical
model as current actions impact the order book and therefore may modify its futures dynamics.
We will actually see that, in certain situations, participants can place aggressive orders or limit
orders in the spread just to try to manipulate the order book’s dynamics in a favorable way. Note
that the dimension of our control space is higher than in [1, 17, 22, 23] since more complex decisions
are required to tackle the market making problem.
However, the ultimate goal of this work is to provide a market simulator. In the last section, we
already present simulations of the market behavior given the pre-computed optimal strategies of the
different actors. More precisely, we will only simulate the evolution of the mean-reverting process
(driving the difference between the stock and the futures price) together with the reconstruction
of the queues when prices move, and let the participants play their optimal strategies given the
1This limitation is for numerical tractability. It is already enough for most markets.
2One could consider a larger set of possible spreads in theory, but refrains to doing this for numerical tractability.
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evolution of the order book due to their different actions. This should allow us to study how these
different market participants may interact among each other if each of them is playing his optimal
policy. In particular, one should observe different market regimes depending on the proportion of
the different participants in the total population, on their risk aversion, etc. First simulations are
provided in this paper, a more throughout study is left for future research.
Our approach therefore lies in between two current streams of literature. The first one is based
on “general equilibrium models”, including economic models, where the market activity is generated
by interactions between rational agents who take optimal decisions that interact through the market
netting process, see e.g. [14, 24, 25]. The second stream of literature considers purely statistical
models where the order book is seen as a random process, see e.g. [2, 3, 8, 12, 13, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21,
26]. The statistical models focus on reproducing many salient features of a real market rather than
agents behaviors and interactions. In our approach, we take into account that the agent’s behavior
are essentially based on statistical approaches, but that they eventually interact with each other.
We end this introduction with an outline of our paper. In Section 2, we present the general
order book dynamics. The marker maker control problem is studied in details in Section 3. There,
we present the equations satisfied by their optimal strategy and propose a numerical solution for
this problem, together with numerical illustrations. In Section 4, we formulate the high-frequency
trader control problem and perform a similar analysis. The institutional broker strategy is described
in Section 5, where we restrict to VWAP and Volume liquidation problems. Finally, in Section 6,
we simulate a realistic market using the three agent’s optimal trading strategies.
2 General order book presentation and priors of the market par-
ticipants
As mentioned above, we focus on a single order book and only model the best bid and ask prices,
in a similar way to [12]. In this section, we describe the general market mechanisms as well as the
priors on which the optimal strategies of the agents are based. We fix a terminal time horizon T
and consider a probability space (Ω,P). Here, Ω := Ω1 × Ω2 and P := P1 ⊗ P2, where Ω1 is the
space of R11-valued cadlag paths on [0, T ] endowed with a probability measure P1 with full support
on Ω1, and Ω2 is the one dimensional Wiener space endowed with the Wiener measure P2.
We denote respectively by (P bt )t≥0 and (P at )t≥0 the best bid offer and the best ask offer processes
on the market. They are valued in dZ where d > 0 is the tick size. We denote by (Qbt )t≥0 and
(Qat )t≥0 the sizes of the corresponding queues valued in N∗. To simplify the notation, we introduce
P := (P b, P a), Q := (Qb, Qa) and define the spread process as δP := P a − P b. Moreover, we
assume3 that δPt ∈ {d, 2d} for all t ≥ 0.
We denote by (τi)i≥1 the times at which orders are sent to the market. We assume that this
sequence is increasing and that #{i ∈ N : τi < T} < ∞ a.s. The market participants can send
different types of orders at each time τi:
• Aggressive orders of size αbi ∈ N∩ [0, Qb] at the bid or of size αai ∈ N∩ [0, Qa] at the ask: the
size of the corresponding queue, Qb or Qa, decreases by the size of the aggressive order, αbi or
αai .
3The extension to more possible spread values is straightforward. We stick to this setting for notational and
computational simplicity. Note that this limit is also justified by empirical evidences for many stocks, see [12].
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• Limit orders of size Lbi ∈ N at the bid or of size Lai ∈ N at the ask: the size of the corresponding
queue, Qb or Qa, increases by the size of the limit order, Lbi or L
a
i .
• When δP = 2d: Limit orders of size Lb,
1
2
i ∈ N at the bid or of size L
a, 1
2
i ∈ N at the ask: the
order is placed inside the spread, at the price P b + d = P a− d, this generates a new queue at
the bid or at the ask, of size Lb,
1
2
i or L
a, 1
2
i , and a price move.
• Cancellations: Cancellations of Mbi ∈ N ∩ [0, Qb] orders at the bid or of Mai ∈ N ∩ [0, Qa]
orders at the ask. The difference between cancellations and aggressive orders is that aggressive
orders consume the bottom of the limit while we see cancellations as only consuming the top
of the limit first.
We assume that the sequence (αbi , α
a
i , L
b
i , L
a
i , L
b, 1
2
i , L
a, 1
2
i ,M
b
i ,M
a
i )i≥1 is made of random vari-
ables leaving, with probability one, on the state space C◦ defined as the collection of elements
(ab, aa, `b, `a, `b,
1
2 , `a,
1
2 ,mb, ma) ∈ N8 such that
abaa = 0
`b = `a = 0 if max{ab, aa} ≥ 1
`b,
1
2 = 0 if max{ab, aa, `b} ≥ 1
`a,
1
2 = 0 if max{ab, aa, `a} ≥ 1
mb = 0 if max{ab, aa, `b, `b, 12 } ≥ 1
ma = 0 if max{ab, aa, `a, `a, 12 } ≥ 1
. (2.1)
We interpret the above expression as follows. First, aggressive orders can not be sent simultaneously
at the bid and at the ask. Next, limit orders (at the current bid/ask prices) can not be placed at the
same time that aggressive orders are sent. Finally, one can not place limit orders within the spread
if limit orders at the current bid/ask prices are placed. Because we only consider the first limits,
these conditions are natural whenever one presumes that orders of different market participants do
not arrive exactly at the same time.
Depending on the arrival of orders, queues can be depleted. In this case, new queues can be
re-generated, at the same prices or at different prices, and possibly with a change of the spread
value. To model this, we introduces a sequence of random variables (i, bi , 
a
i )i≥1 with values in
{0, 1} × (N∗)2. The sequence (i)i≥1 will describe possible jumps of the bid/ask prices, while the
sequence (bi , 
a
i )i≥1 will describe the new sizes of the queues when they are re-generated, after one
of them is depleted. More precisely, we postulate the dynamics
P bτi = P
b
τi−1 + d
[
1{i=1}
(
−1{Qbτi−1=αˆbi } + 1{δPτi−1=2d}1{Qaτi−1=αˆai }
)
+ 1
{Lb,
1
2
i >0}
]
P aτi = P
a
τi−1 + d
[
1{i=1}
(
1{Qaτi−1=αˆai } − 1{δPτi−1=2d}1{Qbτi−1=αˆbi }
)
− 1
{La,
1
2
i >0}
]
Qbτi = Q
b
τi−1 + L
b
i + (L
b, 1
2
i −Qbτi−1)1{Lb, 12i >0}
− αˆbi1{∆P bτi=0} + (
b
i −Qbτi−1)1{∆P bτi 6=0}∪{αˆbi=Qbτi−1}
Qaτi = Q
a
τi−1 + L
a
i + (L
a, 1
2
i −Qaτi−1)1{La, 12i >0}
− αˆai1{∆P aτi=0} + (
a
i −Qaτi−1)1{∆P aτi 6=0}∪{αˆai=Qaτi−1}
(2.2)
for i ≥ 1, where
αˆ
b/a
i := α
b/a
i +M
b/a
i ,
4
with
(P b0 , P
a
0 , Q
b
0, Q
a
0) ∈ DP,Q := {(pb, pa, q) ∈ (dZ)2 × (N∗)2 : pa − pb ∈ {d, 2d}},
and the convention τ0 = 0−. We refer to (2.1) to see that this dynamics is consistent. In particular,
prices can move only if one of the queues is depleted because of the arrival of aggressive orders or if
a new limit order is inserted within the spread. These two situations can not occur simultaneously.
The ask price can move by d when the ask queue is depleted. If the spread was already 2d, then the
bid price moves up as well. The other way around if the bid queue is depleted. In the following,
we extend the dynamics of (P,Q) by considering it as a step constant right-continuous process on
[0, T ].
We now denote by E the N12-valued step constant right-continuous process defined by
∆Eτi := Eτi − Eτi−1 := (αbi , αai , Lbi , Lai , L
b, 1
2
i , L
a, 1
2
i ,M
b
i ,M
a
i ,i, 
b
i , 
a
i , 1), i ≥ 1,
with Eτ0 := E0 := 0. Later on, we shall only write
(Pτi , Qτi) = TP,Q(Pτi−1 , Qτi−1 ,∆Eτi) (2.3)
in which the map TP,Q is defined explicitly by (2.2).
The process E models the flow of all the orders on the market. From the viewpoint of a market
participant, it corresponds to its own orders and to the other participants’ orders that we denote
by E˜ . The process E˜ has jump times (τ˜i)i≥1 ⊂ (τi)i≥1 of sizes
∆E˜τ˜i =
∑
j≥1
1{τ˜i=τj}∆Eτj , i ≥ 1. (2.4)
It induces a counting measure ν˜(dt, de). For a market participant, a prior on this measure is given
by the compensator µ˜ of ν˜ under P. We assume that it is state dependent. More precisely, we
consider a Borel kernel (p, q) ∈ DP,Q 7→ µ˜(·|p, q) ∈ M([0, T ] × N8), whereM([0, T ] × N8) denotes
the collection of non-negative measures on [0, T ] × N8. In particular, it can depend on the order
book’s imbalance, as observed in e.g. [9]. To be consistent with the constraints imposed above, it
satisfies:
µ˜(·|p, q) is supported by C◦, for all (p, q) ∈ DP,Q. (2.5)
It should also be such that aggressive orders and cancellations are never bigger than the correspond-
ing queue size, which will be made more explicit in our numerical example sections, see Section
3.4.
Next, we shall denote by Eφ the flows corresponding to the trading strategy of either a market
maker, a high-frequency trader, or an institutional broker. Thus, she will assume facing a global
flow E = E˜ + Eφ.
Moreover, for simplicity, we shall assume that µ˜ is of the form
dµ˜(c, ε, εb, εa, dt|p, q) = dλ(ε, εb, εa|p, q, c)dβ(c|p, q)dt (2.6)
in which λ and β are bounded Borel non-negative kernels and (without loss of generality)∫
dλ(ε, εb, εa|p, q, c) = 1, for all (p, q, c) ∈ DP,Q ×C◦. (2.7)
Later on, when an order (αbi , α
a
i , L
b
i , L
a
i , L
b, 1
2
i , L
a, 1
2
i ,M
b
i ,M
a
i ) is sent by a MM, an HFT or an IB, we
shall also assume that the conditional law of (i, bi , 
a
i ) is given by λ.
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Remark 2.1. Let γ(p, q) :=
∫
dβ(c|p, q). Then, γ is uniformly bounded by the above assumption.
Let τ be a stopping time and fix h > 0. Since λ integrates to one, it follows that P[#{t ∈ [τ, τ +h] :
∆E˜t 6= 0} = 1|Fτ ] = hγ(Pτ , Qτ ) + o(h) and P[#{t ∈ [τ, τ + h] : ∆E˜t 6= 0} > 1|Fτ ] = o(h).
Moreover, the process counting the number of jumps of E˜ is dominated by a Poisson process with
intensity γ¯ := sup γ < ∞. Hence, P[#{t ≤ T : ∆E˜t 6= 0} ≥ k] ≤ γ¯T/k, for k ≥ 1, by Markov’s
inequality. Similarly, if g is a non-decreasing Borel map, then E[g(#{t ∈ [0, T ] : ∆E˜t 6= 0})] ≤∑
k≥1 g(k)
(γ¯T )k
k! e
−γ¯T .
3 Market maker’s optimal control problem
In this section, we describe the optimal control problem of the market maker, the key tools to
characterize the solution and how to numerically approximate the optimal control.
3.1 Market maker’s strategy and state dynamics
The market maker typically places limit orders in order to make profit of the spread but can turn
aggressive when his inventory is too important. At the end the trading period [0, T ], the later
should be zero. In the following, we denote by G his gain process and by I his inventory. We also
need to keep track of the sizes of his orders already placed at the bid queue, Nb, and at the ask
queue, Na. For simplicity, we impose that new orders can not be placed at the bid (respectively at
the ask) if he already has previously taken a position at the bid (respectively at the ask). Then,
his position at the bid (resp. at the ask) is completely described by Nb (resp. Na) and the number
of units Bb before him in the bid-queue (resp. Ba before him in the ask-queue). Later on, we only
write N = (Nb, Na) and B = (Bb, Ba).
To define the market maker’s control, we assume that he faces the exogenous process E˜ described
in Section 2.
For him, a control is a sequence of random variables φ = (τφi , c
φ
i )i≥1 where (τ
φ
i )i≥1 is an
increasing sequence of times and each cφi = (α
b,φ
i , α
a,φ
i , L
b,φ
i , L
a,φ
i , L
b, 1
2
,φ
i , L
a, 1
2
,φ
i ,M
b,φ
i ,M
a,φ
i ) is C◦-
valued, see below for more implicit restrictions. The times (τφi )i≥1 are the times at which he sends
orders: the action done at τφi is c
φ
i , whose components have the same meanings as in Section 2.
Given his own orders and the other participants’ orders, the sequence of times at which orders are
sent to the market is (τi)i≥1 where τ0 := 0− and τi+1 = min{τ˜j > τi, j ≥ 1}∧min{τφj > τi, j ≥ 1},
see (2.4) and above.
We denote by Eφ the càdlàg process that jumps only at the times τφi s with jump size
∆Eφ
τφi
= (cφi ,
∑
j≥1
(j , 
b
j , 
a
j)1{τφi =τj}
), i ≥ 1,
so that4
E = Eφ + E˜
from his point of view. As usual, we impose that Eφ is predictable for the (completed) filtration
Fφ = (Fφt )t≥0 generated5 by E . We will also keep in mind the number of actions
J :=
∑
i≥1
1{τφi ≤·}
4We keep in mind that E also depends of φ but dot not make this explicit for ease of notations.
5Note that this creates a dependence of the filtration on the control itself, which is similar to [6].
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from time 0 on, as it may induce a cost.
We now impose a minimum and maximum inventory size, denoted by (−I∗, I∗) ∈ (−N) × N,
and that
#{τφi ≤ T, i ≥ 1} ≤ kφ ∧ J◦ a.s., for some kφ ∈ N,
for some J◦ ∈ N ∪ {∞}. The constraint on the inventory is classic. The constraint on the number
of operations can be justified by operational constraints. In the case J◦ = ∞, it just means that
each control should be of essentially bounded activity, but the bound is not uniform on the set of
controls and can be as large as needed.
To be admissible, a control φ should therefore be such that each cφi is C(Zτφi −
)-valued, where
Z := (P,Q,X) with X := (G, I,N,B, J),
and, for z = (pb, pa, qb, qa, g, i, nb, na, bb, ba, j), C(z) is the collection of elements c := (ab, aa, `b,
`a, `b,
1
2 , `a,
1
2 , mb, ma) ∈ C◦ \ {0} such that :
ab ≤ min
{
i+ I∗ − ba ; qb
}
, aa ≤ min
{
I∗ − i− bb ; qa
}
,
`b ≤ (I∗ − i)1{nb=0} , `a ≤ (i+ I∗)1{na=0},
`b,
1
2 ≤ (I∗ − i)1{pa−pb=2d}1{nb=0} , `a,
1
2 ≤ (i+ I∗)1{pa−pb=2d}1{na=0}
mb ≤ nb , ma ≤ na
c = 0 if j = J◦.
Note that the constraints on the first three lines correspond to the fact that we do not want to
take a position that could lead to an inventory out of the limits −I∗ and I∗ if it was suddenly
executed. The indicator functions correspond to additional constraints on the controls, imposed
for numerical tractability: no new limit order can be sent on a side if one has not been executed or
has not cancelled the position on the same side before, no limit order can be sent in the spread if
it is not equal to two ticks. In this case, we write φ ∈ C(0, Z0−).
The dynamics of X is given by
Xτi = TX(Pτi−1 , Qτi−1 , Xτi−1 ,∆Eφτi)1{∆Eφτi 6=0} + T˜X(Pτi−1 , Qτi−1 , Xτi−1 ,∆E˜τi)1{∆Eφτi=0}, (3.1)
in which TX , T˜X : R22 7→ dZ× N× N4 × N. More precisely, consider the map
exe(a, n, b) := min{(a− b)+, n}, a, b, n ∈ N.
It represents the number of stocks set at a limit that are executed when an aggressive order of size
a arrives, that the position in the queue is b, and the size of the posted block at this position is n.
Then, having in mind the constraints encoded in C(·) above, see also (2.1), we can write
TX = (TG, TI , TNb , TNa , TBb , TBa , TJ) , T˜X = (T˜G, T˜I , T˜Nb , T˜Na , T˜Bb , T˜Ba , T˜J)
where
TG(p, q, x, δ) = g + (ab − exe(ab, nb, bb))pb − (aa − exe(aa, na, ba))pa
TI(p, q, x, δ) = i− (ab − exe(ab, nb, bb)) + (aa − exe(aa, na, ba))
TNb/a(p, q, x, δ) = nb/a + [`b/a − nb/a]+ + `b/a,
1
2 −mb/a − exe(ab/a, nb/a, bb/a)
TBb/a(p, q, x, δ) = bb/a + (qb/a − bb/a)1{`b/a 6=0} − bb/a1{mb/a=nb/a} − (bb/a ∧ ab/a)1{ab/a 6=0} − bb/a1{`b/a, 12 6=0}
TJ(p, q, x, δ) = j + 1
7
and
T˜G(p, q, x, δ) = g − exe(ab, nb, bb)pb + exe(aa, na, ba)pa
T˜I(p, q, x, δ) = i+ exe(ab, nb, bb)− exe(aa, na, ba)
T˜Nb/a(p, q, x, δ) = nb/a − exe(ab/a, nb/a, bb/a)
T˜Bb/a(p, q, x, δ) = [bb/a − ab/a]+1{mb/a=0} + (bb/a − [mb/a − (qb/a − bb/a − nb/a)]+)+1{mb/a 6=0}
T˜J(p, q, x, δ) = 0,
for x = (g, i, nb, na, bb, ba, j), δ = (ab, aa, `b, `a, `b,
1
2 , `a,
1
2 ,mb,ma, ε, εb, εa), p = (pb, pa) and q =
(qb, qa) .
Remark 3.1. It follows from (2.6) and the constraint that Eφ is predictable that the probability that
Eφ and E˜ jump at the same time on [0, T ] is zero. This justifies the formulation (3.1).
For later use, note that it follows from (2.2) and (3.1) that
Zτi = T (Zτi−1 ,∆Eφτi)1{∆Eφτi 6=0} + T˜ (Zτi−1 ,∆E˜τi)1{∆Eφτi=0}, (3.2)
in which
T = (TP,Q, TX) and T˜ = (TP,Q, T˜X).
3.2 The optimal control problem
The aim of the market maker is to maximize her expected utility
E[U(ZT )]
in which
U(z) := − exp
(
−η{g + i+pb − i−pa − κ([i+ − qb]+ + [i− − qa]+)− %j}
)
(3.3)
for z = (pb, pa, qb, qa, g, i, nb, na, bb, ba, j). In the above, η > 0 is the absolute risk aversion parameter,
and κ > 0 is a penalty term taking into account that liquidating the current inventory may lead to a
worse price than the one corresponding to the best bid or ask: the quantity i+pb− i−pa corresponds
to the liquidation value of the inventory if the bid and ask queues are big enough to absorb it, the
expression starting from κ takes into account the number of shares that will not be liquidated at
the best limit. The coefficient % ≥ 0 penalizes the number of actions taken by the market maker.
To define the corresponding value function, we now extend the definition of our state processes
by writing
Zt,z,φ = (P t,z,φ, Qt,z,φ, Xt,z,φ)
for the process satisfying (2.2)-(3.1) for the control φ and with initial condition Zt,z,φt− = z ∈ DZ
whereDZ is the collection of elements (pb, pa, qb, qa, g, i, nb, na, bb, ba, j) ∈ DP,Q×dZ×{−I∗, . . . , I∗}×
N4 × {0, . . . , J◦} such that
nb + i ≤ I∗ , i− na ≥ −I∗
bb + nb ≤ qb , ba + na ≤ qa.
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The corresponding set of admissible controls is C(t, z), and the filtration associated to φ ∈ C(t, z)
is Ft,z,φ. We then set
v(t, z) := sup
φ∈C(t,z)
J(t, z;φ) for (t, z) ∈ [0, T ]×DZ ,
where
J(t, z;φ) := E[U(Zt,z,φT )].
Remark 3.2. For later use, observe that
v(t, z) = e−ηgv(t, pb, pa, qb, qa, 0, i, nb, na, bb, ba, j)
for all t ≤ T and z = (pb, pa, qb, qa, g, i, nb, na, bb, ba, j) ∈ DZ . Moreover, if J◦ =∞, we also have
v(t, z) = e−η(g−%j)v¯(t, z) := e−η(g−%j)v(t, pb, pa, qb, qa, 0, i, nb, na, bb, ba, 0)
Remark 3.3. Note that v is bounded from above by 0 by definition. On the other hand, for all
z = (pb, pa, qb, qa, g, i, nb, na, bb, ba, j) ∈ DZ ,
v(t, z) ≥ min
i∈[−I∗,I∗]
E[U(P t,z,0T , 0, 0, g, i, 0, 0, 0, 0, j)]
= e−η(g−%j) min
i∈[−I∗,I∗]
E[U(P t,z,0T , 0, 0, 0, i, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)],
where P t,z,0 corresponds to the dynamics in the case that the MM does not act on the order book
up to T . Moreover, it follows from (3.3) that
E[U(P t,z,0T , 0, 0, 0, i, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)] ≥ −eηI
∗|pb|E[eηI
∗(|P t,z,0,bT −pb|+2d+κ)]
where
sup
pb∈dZ
E[eηI
∗(|P t,z,0,bT −pb|+2d+κ)] <∞,
by Remark 2.1 and the fact that the price can jump only by d when a market event occurs. Thus, v
belongs to the class Lexp∞ of functions ϕ such that ϕ/L is bounded, in which
L(pb, g, j) := e−η(g−I
∗|pb|−%j)
for (pb, g, j) ∈ dZ× dZ× {0, . . . , J◦}.
3.3 The dynamic programming equation
The derivation of the dynamic programming equation is standard, and is based on the dynamic
programming principle. We state below the weak version of Bouchard and Touzi [10], we let v∗ and
v∗ denote the lower- and upper-semicontinuous envelopes of v.
Proposition 3.1. Fix (t, z) ∈ [0, T ] × DZ and a family {θφ, φ ∈ C(t, z)} such that each θφ is a
[t, T ]-valued Ft,z,φ-stopping time and ‖Zt,z,φ
θφ
‖L∞ <∞. Then,
sup
φ∈C(t,z)
E
[
v∗(θφ, Z
t,z,φ
θφ
)
]
≤ v(t, z) ≤ sup
φ∈C(t,z)
E
[
v∗(θφ, Zt,z,φ
θφ
)
]
.
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Proof. The right-hand side inequality follows from a conditioning argument, see [10]. The left-hand
side is more delicate because the set of admissible controls depends on the initial data. However, it
can be easily proved along the lines of Baradel et al. [6] when {θφ, φ ∈ C(t, z)} is [t, T ]∩(N∪{t, T})-
valued. Then, the general case is obtained by approximating [t, T ]-valued stopping times from the
right (recall that Z is right-continuous). 
One can then derive the corresponding dynamic programming equation. For z = (p, q, x) ∈ DZ ,
c ∈ C(z), t ≤ T , and a continuous and bounded function ϕ, we set
Iϕ(t, z) :=
∫
(Kcϕ(t, z)− ϕ(t, z))dβ(c|p, q) and Kϕ(t, z) := sup
c∈C(z)
Kcϕ(t, z)
where we use the convention that K0 = sup{∅} = −∞, and
Kcϕ(t, z) :=
∫
ϕ(t, T (z, c, ε, εb, εa))dλ(ε, εb, εa|p, q, c),
recall (2.6), (2.7) and (3.2).
The partial differential equation characterization of v is then at least formally given by
min {−∂tϕ− Iϕ,ϕ−Kϕ} = 0 on [0, T )×DZ
min {ϕ− U,ϕ−Kϕ} = 0 on {T} ×DZ .
(3.4)
In order to ensure that the above is correct, we need two additional conditions.
Assumption 3.1. For all upper-semicontinuous (resp. lower-semicontinuous) ϕ ∈ Lexp∞ , the map
(t, z) ∈ [0, T ] × DZ 7→ (I,K)ϕ(t, z) is upper-semicontinuous (resp. lower-semicontinuous) and
belongs to Lexp∞ .
Assumption 3.2. There exists a Borel function ψ that is continuously differentiable in time and
such that
(i) 0 ≥ ∂tψ + Iψ on [0, T )×DZ ,
(ii) ψ −Kψ ≥ ι on [0, T ]×DZ for some ι > 0,
(iii) ψ ≥ U on {T} ×DZ ,
(iv) lim inf
n→∞ (ψ/L)(tn, zn) =∞ if |zn| → ∞ as n→∞, for all (tn, zn)n≥1 ⊂ [0, T ]×DZ .
Then, one can actually prove that v is the unique solution of (3.4) in the class Lexp∞ defined in
Remark 3.3.
Theorem 3.1. Let Assumption 3.1 hold. Then, v∗ (resp. v∗) is a viscosity supersolution (resp. sub-
solution) of (3.4). If moreover Assumption 3.2 holds, then v is continuous on [0, T ) ×DZ and is
the unique viscosity solution of (3.4), in the class of (discontinuous) solutions in Lexp∞ .
Proof. In view of Proposition 3.1, the derivation of the viscosity super- and subsolution properties
is very standard under Assumption 3.1, see e.g. [6, 10]. As for uniqueness, let us assume that v and w
are respectively a super- and a subsolution. Let ψ be as in Assumption 3.2. Then, (v−w−ψ)(tn, zn)
converges to −∞ if |zn| → ∞ as n→∞, for any sequence (tn, zn)n≥1 ⊂ [0, T ]×DZ , and showing
that v ≥ w on [0, T ] ×DZ can be done by, e.g., following the line of arguments of [6, Proposition
5.1]. Finally, v∗, v∗ ∈ Lexp∞ by Remark 3.3. 
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Remark 3.4. If J◦ < ∞ and the supports of λ(·|p, q, c) and γ(·|p, q) are bounded, uniformly in
(p, q, c) ∈ (dZ)2 × N2 ×C◦, then it is not difficult to see that the function defined by
ψ(t, z) := e2η(1+I
∗)|z|e−r(j+t), for z = (p, q, g, i, n, b, j) ∈ DZ and t ≤ T,
satisfies the requirements of Assumption 3.2, for r large enough. Verifying Assumption 3.2 in
the case J◦ = ∞ seems much more difficult. On the other hand, the sequence of value functions
associated to a sequence (Jn◦ )n≥1 increases to the value function associated to J◦ =∞ as Jn◦ →∞.
which provides a natural way to construct a convergent numerical scheme for the computation of v
and the optimal control policy, see Sections 3.4 and 3.5 below. Standard arguments based on this
approximation would also imply that v∗ = v and that v is the smallest supersolution of (3.4), in the
class of (discontinuous) solutions in Lexp∞ .
3.4 Dimension reduction, symmetries and numerical resolution
Before to provide a converging numerical scheme for (3.4), let us first recall that the variables g
(and j if J◦ = ∞) can be omitted, see Remark 3.2. If moreover, the transition kernels depend
on prices only through the spread (which is a natural assumption at least on a rather short time
horizon), then one more dimension can be eliminated.
Assumption 3.3. The kernel (p, q, c) ∈ DP,Q ×C 7→ (λ(·|p, q, c), β(·|p, q)) depend on p = (pb, pa)
only through the value of the mid-spread δp := (pa − pb)/2.
Indeed, if Assumption 3.3 holds, then one easily checks that
e−ηip
◦
v¯(t,−δp, δp, qb, qa, 0, i, ·) = v¯(t, p◦ − δp, p◦ + δp, qb, qa, 0, i, ·)
= v¯(t, pb, pa, qb, qa, 0, i, ·)
with p◦ := (pa + pb)/2, so that
eηi(p
b+δp)v¯(t, pb, pb + 2δp, qb, qa, 0, i, ·)
does not depend on pb but only on δp.
The resolution of the equation can also be simplified by using potential symmetries, in the sense
of the following assumption.
Assumption 3.4. For all (p, q) ∈ DP,Q, c := (ab, aa, `b, `a, `b, 12 , `a, 12 ,mb,ma) ∈ C and all Borel
sets O ⊂ {0, 1}, Ob, Oa ⊂ N,∫
O×Ob×Oa
dλ(ε, εb, εa|p, q, c) =
∫
O×Oa×Ob
dλ(ε, εa, εb|p¯, q¯, c¯)
where p¯ = (−pa,−pb), q¯ = (qa, qb) and c¯ = (aa, ab, `a, `b, `a, 12 , `b, 12 ,ma,mb). Moreover, for all Borel
sets O = Oba ×Oaa ×Ob` ×Oa` ×Ob
`
1
2
×Oa
`
1
2
×Obm ×Oam ⊂ N8,∫
O
dβ(c|p, q) =
∫
O¯
dβ(c|p¯, q¯)
where O¯ := Oaa ×Oba ×Oa` ×Ob` ×Oa
`
1
2
×Ob
`
1
2
×Oam ×Obm.
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The above assumption implies that the transition probabilities of the order book are symmetric
at the bid and at the ask, whenever the configurations are. Then, v admits a symmetry which
can be exploited to reduce the complexity of the numerical resolution of (3.4). Namely, under
Assumption 3.4, we have
v¯(t, pb, pa, qb, qa, 0, i, nb, na, bb, ba, j) = v¯(t,−pa,−pb, qa, qb, 0,−i, na, nb, ba, bb, j).
Let us now turn to the definition of a numerical scheme for (3.4). We now make the additional
assumption that the supports of λ and β are bounded (not that they are already discrete, by
nature).
Assumption 3.5. J◦ < ∞ and there exists finite Borel sets O1 ⊂ N8 and O2 ⊂ N3 such that
β(·|p, q) is supported by O1 and λ(·|p, q, c) is supported by O2, for all (p, q, c) ∈ DP,Q ×C.
Then, the operators I and K are explicit. Hence, the only required discretization is in time.
For a time step T/n > 0, we define a time grid pin := {tni , i ≤ n} where tni = iT/n for i ≤ n. We
next consider the sequence of space domains DkZ := DZ ∩ [−k, k]11 for k ≥ 1, and we let vkn be the
solution of
vkn(t
n
i , ·) = max
{
vkn(t
n
i+1, ·) +
T
n
Ivkn(tni+1, ·), max
c∈C(·)
Kc,nvkn(tni+1, ·)
}
= 0 on DkZ , i ≤ n− 1
vkn − U = 0 on ({T} ×DkZ) ∪ (pin × (DZ \DkZ)),
(3.5)
where
Kc,n = Kc + T
n
I ◦ Kc.
This fully explicit scheme is convergent.
Proposition 3.2. Let Assumption 3.5 hold, then the sequence (vkn)k,n≥1 converges pointwise to v
on [0, T )×DZ as k, n→∞.
Proof. First note that (vkn/L)k,n≥1 is uniformly bounded, where L is defined in Remark 3.3. This
follows from Assumption 3.5 and a simple induction argument, compare with Remark 3.3. Then,
standard stability results, see e.g. [7] and [5, Section 3.2], imply that the relaxed upper-limit v∞
and lower-limit of v∞ of (vkn)k,n≥1 are respectively sub- and supersolution of (3.4) and belong to
the class Lexp∞ . The comparison result mentioned in the proof of Theorem 3.1, see Remark 3.4, thus
implies that v∞ ≥ v ≥ v∞ while v∞ ≤ v∞ by definition. 
3.5 Approximate optimal controls
In the following, we estimate the optimal control in a classical way. For each i < n, we choose a
measurable map cˆkn(tni , ·) such that
cˆkn(t
n
i , ·) ∈ arg max{Kc,nvkn(thi+1, ·), c ∈ C(·)} on DkZ
cˆkn(t
n
i , ·) = 0 on DZ \DkZ ,
and define the sequence of stopping times
τˆn,kj+1 := min{tni : i ≥ 0, tni > τˆn,kj , (vkn −Kcˆ
k
nvkn(t
n
i+1, ·))(tni , Zˆn,ktni −) = 0}, j ≥ 0,
with τˆn,k0 := 0−, and in which Zˆn,k = (Pˆn,k, Qˆn,k, Xˆn,k) is defined as in (3.2) for the initial condition
Z0− at 0 and the control associated to φˆkn := (τˆ
n,k
i , cˆ
k
n(τˆ
n,k
i , Zˆ
n,k
τˆn,ki −
))i≥1 in a Markovian way. This
provides a sequence of controls that is asymptotically optimal.
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Proposition 3.3. Let the conditions of Proposition 3.2 hold. Then,
lim
n,k→∞
E[U(Zˆn,kT )] = v(0, Z0−).
Proof. Let γ(p, q) :=
∫
dβ(c|p, q) and recall that γ is uniformly bounded by assumption, as well
as the sequence (vkn)k,n≥1. Then, it follows from Remark 2.1 that
vkn(t
n
i+1, Zˆ
n,k
tni
) +
T
n
Ivkn(tni+1, Zˆn,ktni ) =v
k
n(t
n
i+1, Zˆ
n,k
tni
)(1− T
n
γ(Pˆn,ktni
, Qˆn,ktni
))
+
T
n
∫
Kcvkn(tni+1, Zˆn,ktni )dβ(c|Pˆ
n,k
tni
, Qˆn,ktni
)
=E[vkn(tni+1, T˜ (Zˆn,ktni ,∆E˜tni+1))|F
φˆkn
tni
] + o(n−1)
and, similarly,
K
cˆkn(τˆ
n,k
i ,Zˆ
n,k
τˆ
n,k
i
−
),n
vkn(τˆ
n,k
i +
T
n
, Zˆn,k
τˆn,ki −
) =E[vkn(τˆ
n,k
i +
T
n
, T˜ (Zˆn,k
τˆn,ki +
T
n
−,∆E˜τˆn,ki +Tn ))|F
φˆkn
τˆn,ki −
] + o(n−1)
with the convention that T˜ (·, 0) is the identity. Let θnk be the first time when Zˆn,k exists the
domain DkZ . In view of (3.5), Assumption 3.5 (in particular that J0 <∞) and Remark 2.1 (see the
arguments at the end of Remark 3.3), an induction implies that
vkn(0, Z0−) = E[U(Zˆ
n,k
θnk
)] + on(1) = E[U(Zˆn,kT )] + on(1) + ok(1)
in which on(1) and ok(1) go to 0 as n→∞ and k →∞. It remains to appeal to Proposition 3.2.

3.6 Numerical experiments
We now turn to a numerical experiment. We compute an approximation of the optimal control as
described in Section 3.5, using the simplifications detailed in Section 3.4.
Let us first describe a realistic prior distribution for the evolution of E˜ . The coefficients we use
are inspired from the behavior of the stock Société Générale (CLE FP)6 and from [9].
As for the prior on the dynamics of the market. We simply consider that both market and
limit orders arrive according to a Poisson process. Both limit and aggressive orders arrive with an
intensity of 0.6 per second. When a limit order arrives, it is assigned to the bid or the ask with
probability 1/2. When a market order arrives, we assign it to the bid or the ask according to the
statistics described for big caps in [9, Chart 8 p.10]. Namely, if
Imbτ˜i :=
Qbτ˜i −Qaτ˜i
Qbτ˜i +Q
a
τ˜i
is the order book imbalance at the time τ˜i at which the market order arrives, then it arrives at the
ask with probability 0.5 + 0.35 ∗ Imbτ˜i .
To describe the size of the orders and of the inventory, we take 1/2 of the ATS (mediAn7 Trade
Size) as the unit.
6We thank Chevreux-Kepler for providing us these data.
7Following [9, Page 23].
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The size of the market orders is also assumed to be dependent on the order book imbalance.
We use [9, Chart 16 p.10] to estimate that the size of the trade arriving at the ask (if it arrives
at the ask), represents a percentage of the queue (that we round to an integer number, by above).
Namely, we set fˆaτ˜i := 0.7 + 0.3 ∗ Imbτ˜i , and assign a (conditional) probability of 60% that the order
is of size round[ˆfaτ˜i ∗Qaτ˜i ] and the same probability that the executed volume deviates from the latter
by one unit (with equal probability to be by one more and one less unit - if quantities are negative
or bigger than the size of the queue, we obviously set them to 0 or to the size of the queue).
We use a simpler modeling approach for the limit orders. With 55% probability a limit order
(if it arrives) is of size of 2 (recall that the unit is 1/2 of an ATS). It is of size 3 with probability
10% and of size 1 with probability 35%. Again, it is based on [9].
When a queue is depleted, the probability of a price move is set to P[i = 1|Fτ˜i ] = 75%. If the
bid is depleted but the bid price does not go down, the size of the new bid queue is set to 2 units
with probability 60%, 1 unit with probability 25% and 3 units with probability 15%, otherwise it
is set to 10 units with probability 60%, 5 units with probability 25% and 12 units with probability
15%. The same applies to the ask price if this is the ask queue that is depleted.
If both ask and bid prices move, recall (2.3), we take the same distribution for both queues and
consider them as being (conditionally) independent. The distribution corresponds to the one of a
price move, as described above.
When the spread is equal to two ticks, the next limit order arrives in the spread with probability
90%. This models the fact that a spread of two ticks is not common, see e.g. [12]. To be consistent
with the probability of arrival of market orders at the bid or at the ask, we assume that a new
bid limit is created in the spread with probability 0.5 + 0.35 ∗ Imbτ˜i (otherwise, this is a new ask
limit). The size of this new limit is 2 with 55%, of size 3 with probability 10% and of size 1 with
probability 35%. This corresponds to the behavior of the stock Société Générale (CLE FP). We do
not change the dynamic of aggressive orders with the size of the spread.
Let us now describe the other parameters of the Market Maker’s optimal control problem. We
set the bid price to 10 at time 0−, the spread is one tick, and the tick equal to 0.01, recall from
Section 3.4 that only the spread size matters (because we have here the required symmetry) and
observe that the latter can be rescaled together with the level of risk aversion, which is here fixed
to η = 1. We take κ = 0.02 and % = 10−20. The time horizon is T = 59 seconds, and the time step
is 1 second. We keep a small time horizon for a better visibility of the evolution of the order book.
We do not consider cancellations from the rest of the market for simplicity. Moreover, in order to
reduce the computation time, we add the additional constraint that the MM can not cancel only
part of position in a queue, he can only cancel the whole position. We also fix a maximal queue
size of 12 and fix the maximal absolute value of the inventory to I∗ = 7. The size of the limit and
market orders sent by the MM are constrained to be less than 3. This corresponds to adding an
additional constraint in the definition of C(·) which does not change the above analysis.
In Figure 2, we provide a simulated path of the optimal strategy, starting from a symmetric
configuration of the order book, with queue lengths equal to 6. In this simulation, the MM always
play before the other (random) players8. The top left graphic describes the control played by
the MM. Triangles pointing outward (with respect to the zero line) correspond to limit orders, the
number of triangles giving their size. Arrows with triangles pointing inward are cancellations, again
the number of triangles gives the size. Aggressive orders are symbolized by lines with squares, while
limit orders within the spread correspond to the lines with dots. The top right graphic gives the
state of the order book just after the MM has played, and before the nature (i.e. the other players)
8This is just a convention, since the transition probabilities do not depend on time.
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plays. The size of the lines gives the total length of each queues, while the dots symbolize the
position of the MM in the queue. The middle left graphic describes the state of the order book
after the nature plays. The bottom left graphic gives the value of the portfolio of the MM if he had
to liquidate (by sending aggressive orders) his stock holding at the best bid/ask price. The final
value gives the “true” liquidation value of the book. In the case that the final inventory can not
be liquidated at the best bid/ask price, we liquidate the remaining part at the best bid/ask price
minus/plus one tick. The middle right graphic is the inventory just before he plays and the bottom
right one is the bid and ask prices just after he plays. Figure 1 provides the distribution of the gain
made by the MM, it uses 105 simulated paths.
His strategy can seem difficult to interpret at first sight. But, we have to remember that he
believes that the imbalance plays an important role in the book order dynamics, and that he not
only should take care of it but that he can actually use it: some limit orders are sent not to be
executed but to influence the evolution of the price in a favorable direction. Also note that he
should avoid the price to go down/up if his inventory is positive/negative. Having this in mind, it
is not surprising that he can be sometimes at the limit of a price manipulation strategy, if he is big
enough with respect to the market, which is the case in these simulations. Finally, we have to keep
in mind that his strategy is constrained. He sometimes cancels positions to be free to react more
quickly to a more favorable market configuration later on.
Not surprisingly, the MM first sends limit orders of equal sizes on both sides of the order book.
Nothing happens until time t = 9. At this time is inventory is 2 and his position at the ask is still
far from the beginning of the queue. In order to avoid increasing again his inventory, he cancels his
remaining position of one unit at the bid. He puts a new position at the bid at time 10 after the
queue has slightly increased, because of an exogenous limit order. Unfortunately for him, this new
position is immediately executed, and his inventory jumps to 5. After the queue is regenerated, he
immediately puts a limit order of size 2 at the bid. His reasoning is the following: 1. this position has
little chance to be executed immediately, he does not take a risk of again increasing his inventory;
2. by doing this he increases the imbalance and therefore the probability of being executed at the
ask so has to gain the spread and reduce his inventory. This strategy is successful since immediately
2 units of his positions at the ask are executed. The imbalance is still good even if he cancels his
last unit at the bid, so as to be free to play the control he wants once his last unit at the ask will
be executed. In fact, it does not work and he decides to refresh his global position at time 16 by
canceling his final unit at the ask and putting limit orders again at time 17 in a symmetric way.
This is a limit spread order at the bid. This makes sense since he has to avoid the stock price to go
down, because he has a positive inventory. The fact that just after he alternates between putting
and canceling limit orders at the ask is probably a numerical artifact: on the one hand, he wants to
have a limit position at the ask because his inventory is large, on the other hand he does not want
to increase the imbalance to avoid having a too big probability of being executed at the bid and of
seeing the price go down. Similarly, he wants to keep a position at the bid to avoid a downward
price move, while he really does not want to be executed on this side. The aggressive order at the
bid at time 19 is just a partial cancellation, that is completed at time 20. He just does not want
to be executed. By doing so, he unfortunately causes a downward jump of the bid, which is not
good for him. Just after he sends a limit spread order at the bid to fight against this downward
pressure, and then cancels it once the bid is back at a distance one tick of the ask. This strategy is
successful. The rest of his orders can be interpreted in a similar manner. Just note that he starts to
be aggressive at the bid side at time 49 because his inventory is too big and the maturity starts to
be quite close, in particular the first market order of size 3 compensates the execution of a position
of size 3 at the bid just before (so that the graphic of the inventory does not move, although the
15
inventory temporary jumps to the upper limit 7).
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Figure 1: Density estimation of the gain made by the Market Maker.
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Figure 2: Simulated path of the optimal strategy of the Market Maker.
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4 High frequency trader’s pair trading problem
We now turn to the HFT strategy. We consider a pair trading strategy where the trader invests
in the difference of two highly correlated assets. Here, we choose the futures price of the stock to
be the second asset. The order book defined in Section 2 represents the dynamics of the stock.
Whenever the trader buys/sells n units of stocks (being by an aggressive order or by the execution
of a limit order), she sells/buys immediately n units of the futures. Her inventory should be fully
liquidated at T .
4.1 The optimal control problem
We assume that the reference price F of the futures is given by
F =
P b + P a
2
+ S (4.1)
where S is a mean-reverting process
S = S0 +
∫ ·
0
ρ(sˆ− St)dt+
∫ ·
0
σ(St)dWt. (4.2)
Here, ρ is the strength of mean reversion, sˆ is the average of mean reversion and σ : R 7→ R is
a Lipschitz bounded function representing the volatility of the process. In the following, we shall
assume that
the support of σ is bounded. (4.3)
Remark 4.1. The above implies in particular that S lies in a certain compact set DS as soon as
S0 does. This could clearly be relaxed to the price of a finer analysis.
The strategy of the HFT is described by the same quantities as the one of the MM in Section
3. The only difference lies in the fact that she constantly holds a number equal to −I units of the
futures F . We assume that buying/selling the futures leads to the payment of a proportional cost
κ ≥ 0. Then, the dynamics of the corresponding state process X is given by
Xτi = TX(Sτi , Pτi−1 , Qτi−1 , Xτi−1 ,∆Eφτi)1{∆Eφτi 6=0} + T˜X(Sτi , Pτi−1 , Qτi−1 , Xτi−1 ,∆E˜τi)1{∆Eφτi=0},
(4.4)
with TX and T˜X now defined with respect to
TG(s, p, q, x, δ) = g + (ab − exe(ab, nb, bb))∆b− − (aa − exe(aa, na, ba))∆a+
TI(s, p, q, x, δ) = i− (ab − exe(ab, nb, bb)) + (aa − exe(aa, na, ba))
TNb/a(s, p, q, x, δ) = nb/a + [`b/a − nb/a]+ + `b/a,
1
2 −mb/a − exe(ab/a, nb/a, bb/a)
TBb/a(p, q, x, δ) = bb/a + (qb/a − bb/a)1{`b/a 6=0} − bb/a1{mb/a=nb/a} − (bb/a ∧ ab/a)1{ab/a 6=0} − bb/a1{`b/a 6=0}
TJ(s, p, q, x, δ) = j + 1
and
T˜G(s, p, q, x, δ) = g − exe(ab, nb, bb)∆b+ + exe(aa, na, ba)∆a−
T˜I(s, p, q, x, δ) = i+ exe(ab, nb, bb)− exe(aa, na, ba)
T˜Nb/a(s, p, q, x, δ) = nb/a − exe(ab/a, nb/a, bb/a)
T˜Bb/a(p, q, x, δ) = [bb/a − ab/a]+1{mb/a=0} + (bb/a − [mb/a − (qb/a − bb/a − nb/a)]+)+1{mb/a 6=0}
T˜J(s, p, q, x, δ) = 0,
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in which
∆b± := p
b − p
b + pa
2
− s± κ , ∆a± := pa −
pb + pa
2
− s± κ.
In the above, we used the notations x = (g, i, nb, na, bb, ba, j), δ = (ab, aa, `b, `a, `b,
1
2 , `a,
1
2 ,mb, ma,
ε, εb, εa), p = (pb, pa) and q = (qb, qa).
The set of admissible controls C(0, S0, Z0−) is defined as in Section 3 but with respect to the
(completed) filtration Fφ = (Fφt )t≥0 generated by (S, E).
We also assume that she has an exponential type utility function, with risk aversion parameter
η > 0. Then, she wants to maximize over φ ∈ C(0, S0, Z0−) the expected utility
E[U(ST , ZφT )]
where
U(s, z) := − exp
(
−η{g + i+∆b− − i−∆a+ − κ([i+ − qb]+ + [i− − qa]+)− %j}
)
(4.5)
for z = (pb, pa, qb, qa, g, i, nb, na, bb, ba, j), and where ∆b± and ∆a± are defined as above.
As in Section 3, we next extend the definition of our state processes by writing
(St,s, Zt,s,z,φ) = (St,s, P t,s,z,φ, Qt,s,z,φ, Xt,s,z,φ)
for the process satisfying (2.2)-(3.1)-(4.2) for the control φ and the initial condition (St,st , Z
t,s,z,φ
t− )
= (s, z) ∈ DS × DZ . The corresponding set of admissible controls is C(t, s, z), and the filtration
associated to φ ∈ C(t, s, z) is Ft,s,z,φ = (F t,s,z,φs )s∈[t,T ]. We finally define the value function
v(t, s, z) := sup
φ∈C(t,s,z)
J(t, s, z;φ) for (t, s, z) ∈ [0, T ]×DS ×DZ ,
where
J(t, s, z;φ) := E[U(St,sT , Z
t,s,z,φ
T )].
We close this section with Remarks that are the counterparts of Remarks 3.2 and 3.3.
Remark 4.2. For later use, observe that
v(t, s, z) = e−η(g−%j)v¯(t, z) := e−η(g−%j)v(t, s, pb, pa, qb, qa, 0, i, nb, na, bb, ba, 0)
for all t ≤ T , s ∈ DS and z = (pb, pa, qb, qa, g, i, nb, na, bb, ba, j) ∈ DZ .
Remark 4.3. Note that v is bounded from above by 0 by definition. It also follows from (4.3) that
St,s takes values in the compact set DS so that v ∈ Lexp∞ by the same reasoning as in Remark 3.3.
4.2 The dynamic programming equation
As in Section 3.3, we first provide a dynamic programming principle. Again, we let v∗ and v∗
denote the lower- and upper-semicontinuous envelopes of v.
Proposition 4.1. Fix (t, s, z) ∈ [0, T ]×DS ×DZ and a family {θφ, φ ∈ C(t, s, z)} such that each
θφ is a [t, T ]-valued Ft,s,z,φ-stopping time and ‖(St,s
θφ
, Zt,s,z,φ
θφ
)‖∞ <∞. Then,
sup
φ∈C(t,x,q)
E
[
v∗(θφ, S
t,s
θφ
, Zt,s,z,φ
θφ
)
]
≤ v(t, s, z) ≤ sup
φ∈C(t,x,q)
E
[
v∗(θφ, St,s
θφ
, Zt,s,z,φ
θφ
)
]
.
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Proof. Let Ck(t, x, z) be the set of controls φ satisfying the additional constraint #{τφi , i ≥ 1} ≤ k
a.s., and let vk be the corresponding value function, for k ≥ 1. Then, it is not difficult to see that
vk is continuous, and the arguments of [10] imply that
sup
φ∈Ck(t,x,z)
E
[
vk(θ
φ, St,s
θφ
, Zt,s,z,φ
θφ
)
]
≤ vk(t, s, z)
≤ sup
φ∈Ck(t,x,z)
E
[
vk(θ
φ, St,s
θφ
, Zt,s,z,φ
θφ
)
]
≤ sup
φ∈C(t,x,z)
E
[
v(θφ, St,s
θφ
, Zt,s,z,φ
θφ
)
]
.
Since by definition v = limk→∞ ↑ vk and C(t, x, z) = ∪k≥1Ck(t, x, z), sending k → ∞ in the above
leads to the required result, recall Remark 4.3. 
The partial differential equation associated to v is then at least formally given by
min {−Lϕ− Iϕ,ϕ−Kϕ} = 0 on [0, T )×DS ×DZ
min {ϕ− U,ϕ−Kϕ} = 0 on {T} ×DS ×DZ ,
(4.6)
in which L is the Dynkin operator associated to (4.2):
Lϕ = ∂tϕ+ ρ(sˆ− s)∂sϕ+ 1
2
σ2∂2ssϕ.
To fully characterize the value function, we need the additional assumption, similar to Assump-
tion 3.2.
Assumption 4.1. There exists a Borel function ψ ∈ C1,2([0, T ]×DS ×DZ) such that
(i) 0 ≥ Lψ + Iψ on [0, T )×DS ×DZ ,
(ii) ψ −Kψ ≥ ι on [0, T ]×DS ×DZ for some ι > 0,
(iii) ψ ≥ U on {T} ×DS ×DZ ,
(iv) lim inf
n→∞ (ψ/L)(tn, sn, zn) =∞ if |zn| → ∞ as n→∞, for all (tn, sn, zn)n≥1 ⊂ [0, T ]×DS×DZ .
Theorem 4.1. Let Assumption 3.1 hold. Then, v∗ (resp. v∗) is a viscosity supersolution (resp. sub-
solution) of (4.6). If moreover Assumption 4.1 holds, then v is continuous on [0, T ) ×DZ and is
the unique viscosity solution of (4.6), in the class Lexp∞ .
Proof. In view of Proposition 4.1, the derivation of the viscosity super- and subsolution properties is
very standard under Assumption 3.1, see e.g. [10]. As for uniqueness, this follows from a comparison
principle that can be proved in the class Lexp∞ by arguing as in the proof of Theorem 3.1. 
As for the MM problem, Assumption 4.1 is easily checked when J◦ <∞.
Remark 4.4. If J◦ < ∞ and the supports of λ(·|p, q, c) and γ(·|p, q) are bounded, uniformly in
(p, q, c) ∈ (dZ)2×N2×C◦, then the function ψ defined in Remark 4.4 also satisfies the requirements
of Assumption 4.1, for r large enough.
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4.3 Dimension reduction, symmetries and numerical resolution
As in Section 3.4, one can use specificities of the value function to reduce the complexity of the res-
olution of (4.6). First, the variable (g, j) can be omitted, see Remark 4.2. Moreover, if Assumption
3.3 holds, then one easily checks that
v¯(t, s, pb, pb + 2δp, qb, qa, 0, i, nb, na, bb, ba, 0)
does not depend on pb. The difference with the relation obtained in Section 3.4 is du to (4.1) and
the fact that the HFT always hold a symmetric position in the stock and the futures (he is protected
against evolutions of the mid-price). The other symmetry relations described in Section 3.4 do not
hold because of the dependence on the process S.
Let us now turn to the definition of a numerical scheme for (4.6). Recall that, under Assumption
3.5, the operators I and K are explicit. Hence, the only required discretization is in time and in the
variable s. We shall consider separately the diffusion part and the obstacle part of the PDE. More
precisely, we fix a time and a space grid pint := {tni , i ≤ nt} and pins := {sni , i ≤ ns} where tni = iT/nt
for i ≤ nt and sni = s+ i(s− s)/ns, i ≤ ns. Here, s and s are such that DS = [s, s], recall Remark
4.1, and n := (nt, ns) ∈ N2. We next define the sequence of space domains DkZ := DZ ∩ [−k, k]11
for k ≥ 1, and we let vkn be defined by
vkn = max
{
vˇkn,Kvˇkn
}
= 0 on pint × pins ×DkZ ,
vkn − U = 0 on ({T} × pins ×DkZ) ∪ (pint × pins × (DZ \DkZ)).
(4.7)
Here, for i ≤ nt − 1 and i′ ≤ ns,
vˇkn(t
n
i , s
n
i′ , ·) = E[vkn(tni+1, pn(S
tni ,s
n
i′
tni+1
), ·)] + T
n
Ivkn(tni+1, sni′ , ·), on DkZ , (4.8)
where pn is the left-hand side projection operator on pins .
Note that the above numerical scheme is not fully explicit as it requires to compute conditional
expectations. This can however be easily performed either by a finite difference scheme or by
Monte-Carlo techniques in a very classical way. Note in particular that the randomness in these
conditional expectations only comes from a one dimensional factor.
Proposition 4.2. Let Assumptions 4.1 and 3.5 hold, then the sequence (vkn)n≥1 converges pointwise
to v as nt, ns, k →∞.
Proof. Note that Assumption 4.1 ensures that comparison holds for (4.6) in the class Lexp∞ , see
e.g., [6, Proposition 5.1]. Thus, as for Proposition 3.2, the result is an easy consequence of the
stability result of [7]. 
4.4 Approximate optimal controls
The optimal control can be numerically estimated as in Section 3.4. We first extend (vkn, vˇkn) to
pint ×DS ×DZ by setting (vkn, vˇkn)(·, s, ·) := (vkn, vˇkn)(·,pn(s), ·). Then, we choose a measurable map
cˆkn(t
n
i , ·) such that
cˆkn(t
n
i , ·) ∈ arg max{Kcvˇkn(thi , s, ·), c ∈ C(·)} , on DS ×DkZ
cˆkn(t
n
i , ·) = 0 on DS × (DZ \DkZ),
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and define the sequence of stopping times
τˆn,kj+1 := min{tni : i ≥ 0, tni > τˆn,kj , (vkn −Kcˆ
k
n vˇkn(t
n
i , ·))(tni , Stni , Zˆtni −) = 0}, j ≥ 0,
with τˆn,k0 := 0−, and in which Zˆn,k = (Pˆn,k, Qˆn,k, Xˆn,k) is defined as in (3.2)-(4.2) for the initial
condition Z0− and the control associated to φˆkn := (τˆ
n,k
i , cˆ
k
n(τˆ
n,k
i , Sτˆn,ki
, Zˆn,k
τˆn,ki −
))i≥1 in a Markovian
way. Again, this provides a sequence of controls that is asymptotically optimal.
Proposition 4.3. Let the conditions of Proposition 4.2 hold. Then,
lim
k→∞
lim
nt,ns→∞
E[U(ST , Zˆn,kT )] = v(0, S0, Z0−),
in which the limit is taken along sequences n such that n2tn−1s → 0.
Proof. Let γ(p, q) :=
∫
dβ(c|p, q) and recall that γ is uniformly bounded by assumption. The
family {(vkn, vˇkn)/L}k,n≥1 is uniformly bounded, compare with Remark 4.3. Also note that (s, z) ∈
DS ×DkZ 7→ U is Ck-Lipschitz, for some Ck > 0 that only depends on k. By induction (recall that
the component s is projected on pins ),
|vˇkn(·, s, ·)− vˇkn(·, s′, ·)| ≤ C ′k[|s− s′|+ ntO(n−1s )], for all s, s′ ∈ DS , on DkZ ,
for some C ′k > 0 that does not depend on n∈ N2. Since S is 1/2-Hölder in time in L2, together
with Assumption 3.5, this implies that
KcIvˇkn(tni+1, sni′ , z) = KcE[Ivˇkn(tni+1, S
tni ,s
n
i′
tni+1
, z)] +Ok(n
− 1
2
t ) + ntOk(n
−1
s ),
= E[vˇkn(tni+1, S
tni ,s
n
i′
tni+1
, Z
tni ,z,c
tni+1
)] +Ok(n
− 1
2
t ) + ntOk(n
−1
s ) for z ∈ DkZ , c ∈ C(z),
in which the exponent c in Ztni ,z,c means that the impulse c is given at tni , and we use Remark
2.1 again. In the above, Ok(ξ) is a function, that may depend on k, but such that ξ ∈ R \ {0} 7→
|Ok(ξ)|/ξ is bounded in a neighborhood of 0. By the arguments already used in the proof of
Proposition 3.3, it follows that
vkn(t
n
i , s
n
i′ , z) =E[v
k
n(t
n
i+1, S
tni ,s
n
i′
tni+1
, Z
tni ,z,0
tni+1
)] ∨ max
c∈C(z)
E[vkn(tni+1, S
tni ,s
n
i′
tni+1
, Z
tni ,z,c
tni+1
)]
+ ok(n
−1
t ) + ntOk(n
−1
s ),
and therefore
vkn(0, S0, Z0−) = E[U(Sθnk , Zˆ
n,k
θnk
)] + okn(1) +Ok(n
2
tn
−1
s )
= E[U(ST , Zˆn,kT )] + o
k
n(1) +Ok(n
2
tn
−1
s ) + ok(1)
by induction, in which okn(1) goes to 0 as n → ∞, ok(1) goes to 0 as k → ∞, and θnk is as in the
proof of Proposition 3.3. It remains to appeal to Proposition 4.2. 
4.5 Numerical experiments
We use the same model as the one described in Section 3.6. As for the new parameters, we take
sˆ = 0, ρ = 50 and σ = 0.2, in particular the mean reversion parameter is taken to be large.
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Figure 3: Simulated path of the optimal strategy of the High Frequency Trader.
We approximate the behavior of the spread process S by a trinomial tree based on the transition
probabilities associated to the diffusion (4.2), so that the expectation in (4.8) can be computed
explicitly. More precisely, we consider a centered 6 points grid with mesh equal to half a tick
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(i.e. 0.005).
The graphics in Figure 3 have the same interpretation as in Section 3.6 except that we now also
provide the evolution of the Futures process F , this is the dashed line in the bottom right graphic.
Remember that the HFT does not gain from the evolution of the mid-price, as her position in stocks
in always covered by a symmetric position in the futures. She only gains from the evolution of the
spread process S or from the bid-ask spread of the stock if S does not move. Not surprisingly, her
behavior is quite different from the one of the MM described in Section 3.4.
As the MM would do, she first positions herself on the limits in a symmetric ways, because the
spread with the future is 0. She then tries selling at time 4 by sending a limit sell order in the
spread to buy the futures whose price (compared to the mid-price of the stock) is gone low. She is
starting to play on the stock-futures spread. She follows this strategy until time 14. She plays in
a more symmetric way after this until time 35, with a slight tendency to resume her inventory. At
time 35, she decides to clearly sell stocks again and buy the futures whose price is again very low.
From time 40 on, she inverts her position on the book to try buying the stock and thus sells the
futures whose price has gown up. She finally inverts her position again at time 50 when the futures
price goes back to the mid price, to liquidate her position on the pair.
Compared to the positions of the MM in Figure 2, her positions in one direction are much more
clear, and are clearly driven by the stock-futures spread. The HFT also does not seem to try to
control the stock’s mid-price as the MM did, again this is because it does not matter for her.
In Figure 4, we provide an estimation of the density of the gain of the HFT based on 105
simulated paths.
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Figure 4: Density estimation of the gain made by the High Frequency Trader.
5 Institutional broker strategies for portfolio liquidation
We now turn to the Institutional Broker problem. We consider in the following the two mostly used
strategies for buying/selling a block of stocks. We focus on the buying side, selling being performed
in a symmetrical way.
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5.1 Volume strategy
We first consider a simple volume strategy. The aim of the broker is to buy I0 stocks. By convention,
we set I0 = −I◦. She fixes a participation rate f ∈ (0, 1). It corresponds to the percentage of the
total volume of trades that should correspond to trades done by the broker between the initial time
0 and the time at which the I0 stocks are bought. Therefore, she should buy f/(1− f) of the total
of the trades of the other market participant. To do so, she considers subintervals [ti, ti+1] of R+.
At the beginning of each of this subintervals she estimates the conditional probability pi,i+1 that a
trade arrives at the bid, given that a trade arrives and given the order book at ti. Then, she puts a
limit bid order of size (f/(1− f))Qbti/pi,i+1 at ti. When all these units are executed, she adds new
limit orders to keep her position to a level at least equal to (f/(1−f))Qbti/pi,i+1, or do nothing if this
level is still achieved, and so on. In the meantime, she compares her realized volume ∆I := I − I0
to the volume v˜(0, ·) + ∆I realized on the market from time 0 on. Given a threshold δI > 0, she
stops adding limit orders and cancels her orders already at the bid if ∆I(1− f) > fv˜(0, ·) + δI and
waits until ∆I(1 − f) ≤ fv˜(0, ·) + δI . If ∆I(1 − f) < fv˜(0, ·) − δI , then she sends an aggressive
order so as to turn to a position ∆I(1 − f) ≥ fv˜(0, ·) − δI as soon as possible. She stops trading
when I ≥ 0.
For our numerical experiment, we take the same model as in Section 3.6, we consider a partic-
ipation rate f = 0.2 and simply take pi,i+1 = 1/2. The time intervals [ti, ti+1] have a length of 60
seconds and the time step is 1/2 second. We take δI = 4 (i.e. 2 ATS). The number of units to buy
is I◦ = 250 units. A simulated path of the strategy is provided in Figure 5. In the top left graphic,
the dashed lines correspond to the target volume ±δI , while the solid curve is the volume traded
by the IB. The top right graphic gives the control of the IB: lines with inward pointing arrows are
limit orders, lines with squares are market orders. The bottom left graphic provides the evolution
of the average price at which stocks have been bought by the IB from time 0 on. The bottom right
graphic gives the evolution of the bid and ask prices. One can see that this very simple strategy is
quite efficient in the sense that only a limited number of market orders are sent. On the other hand,
the systematic position of the IB at the bid limit creates an important imbalance that contributes
to push up the price.
Figure 6 provides an histogram of the relative error (in %) of the VWAP obtained by this
strategy with respect to the VWAP realized at the level of the whole market9. It is based on 104
simulated paths. One can see that this average price is typically slightly higher than the VWAP of
the market.
9Namely, (VWAPVol−VWAPMarket)/VWAPMarket in which VWAPVol is the VWAP obtained by the IB by playing
his volume strategy.
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Figure 5: Simulated path of the volume strategy.
Percentage difference with the market VWAP
Figure 6: Histogram of the VWAP percentage error with respect to the VWAP of the market, for
the Volume strategy.
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5.2 VWAP
We now present a VWAP (Volume Weighted Average Price) based trading strategy frequently
practiced by institutional brokers. Suppose that, at initial time 0, an institutional broker decides
to buy a quantity I0 ∈ N of a tradable asset using a VWAP based strategy, i.e. by trying to obtain
an average execution cost not more than
VWAPT =
wT
v(0, T )
where w :=
∫ ·
0
vtPtdt and v(·, T ) :=
∫ T
·
vsds, (5.1)
in which v is a deterministic non-negative continuous process such that
∫ T
0 vtdt > 0, which represents
the trading volume of the market, and P models the stock price.10
5.2.1 Abstract continuous time resolution
Following the seminal work of Almgren and Chriss [4], see also [15, Section 4.4], we first consider
the idealized world in which trading is done continuously at a bounded intensity, the trading speed
ϑ, taken as a process in the class C of non-negative processes adapted to the (completed) filtration
generated by W . She assumes that the dynamics of the asset reference price P has a permanent
linear price impact generated by the agent’s trading activity, see [4]. More precisely, she assumes
that the stock price evolves according to
dPt = βϑtdt+ σdWt, (5.2)
with β, σ > 0, while her inventory I follows the dynamics
dIt = ϑtdt
with the initial condition I0 = −I0, meaning that she is short at 0 of the I0 stocks she has to buy
on [0, T ].
She also assumes that her wealth G is affected by a temporary linear market impact κϑ, for
some κ > 0, i.e.
dGt = −ϑt
[
Pt + κϑt
]
dt. (5.3)
Her goal is to maximize over ϑ ∈ C the expected utility
E
[
− exp[−η{GT + IT (PT − κ˜IT )− I0 wT
v(0, T )
}]
]
, (5.4)
for some κ˜ > 0 which represents a penalty in case the inventory does not match 0 at T .
This type of problems has been widely studied, see the book [15] for references. In the present
form, it can be solved explicitly by using a verification argument based on the explicit solution of the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation corresponding to the value function (t, p, i, g, w) ∈ [0, T ]×R4 7→
v(t, p, i, g, w) associated to the initial condition (Pt, It, Gt,wt) = (t, p, i, g, w):
0 = sup
u≥0
(
∂tϕ+
1
2
σ2∂2ppϕ+ pvt∂wϕ+ u (β∂pϕ+ ∂iϕ− p∂gϕ)− u2κ∂gϕ
)
on [0, T )× R4
10We take it deterministic for simplicity. In practice, it generally corresponds to a market volume curve estimated
by the broker.
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with terminal condition
ϕ(T, p, i, g, w) = −e−η{g+i(p−κ˜i)−m¯0w} for (p, i, g, w) ∈ R4,
where
m¯ := I0/v(0, T ).
To simplify the above, we first write v is the form
v(t, p, i, g, w) = e−η(g−m¯w−pv(t,T )m¯)v¯(t, p, i) with v¯(t, p, i) := v(t, p, i, 0, 0),
so that v¯ formally solves
0 = ∂tϕ+
1
2
σ2(∂2ppϕ+ 2ηv(t, T )m¯∂pϕ+ η
2v(t, T )2m¯2ϕ)− (β∂pϕ+ βηv(t, T )m¯ϕ+ ∂iϕ+ ηpϕ)
2
4κηϕ
on [0, T )× R4, with terminal condition
ϕ(T, p, i, g, w) = −e−η{i(p−κ˜i)} for (p, i, g, w) ∈ R4.
One possible solution is given by
v¯(t, p, i) = −e−η{i(p−κ˜i)}eh0(t)+h1(t)i+h2(t)i2
in which h0, h1 and h2 solve11 on [0, T )
∂th0 = −1
2
σ2(ηv(t, T )m¯)2 +
(h1 + βηv(t, T )m¯)
2
4κη
∂th1 = σ
2η2v(t, T )m¯+ (h1 + βηv(t, T )m¯)
−βη + 2ηκ˜+ 2h2
2κη
∂th2 = −η
2σ2
2
+
[−βη + 2ηκ˜+ 2h2]2
4κη
with h0(T ) = h1(T ) = h2(T ) = 0. The solution of the last equation is of the form
h2(t) =
1
c1 + c2ec3(T−t)
− c4
in which the constants c1, . . . , c4 can be computed explicitly by using the above differential equation
and the terminal condition h2(T ) = 0. Namely, set
a0 := −η
2σ2
2
+
η(2κ˜− β)2
4κ
, a1 :=
2κ˜− β
κ
, a2 =
1
κη
and let y◦ be a root12 of
(4a0a2 − a21)y2 + (a21 − 4a0a2)y + a0a2 = 0,
then
c3 =
a1
1− 2y◦ , c4 =
a0
(1− y◦)c3 , c1 =
y◦
c4
, c2 =
1
c4
− c1.
11Just insert the above in the PDE of v¯ and match the orders in the i variable.
12The function h2 does not depend on the choice of the root.
28
Existence of y◦ is guaranteed since
a21 − 4a0a2 =
η2σ2
2
> 0.
Then, h0 and h1 are fully characterized.
An easy verification argument shows that this is actually the correct function and that the
optimal control policy is given by
ϑˆ = vˆ(·, I)
where
vˆ(t, i) :=
β∂pv(t, p, i, g, w) + ∂iv(t, p, i, g, w)− p∂gv(t, p, i, g, w)
2κ∂gv(t, p, i, g, w)
=
β[i− v(t, T )m¯]− 2κ˜i− [h1(t) + 2h2(t)i]/η
2κ
.
5.2.2 Strategy in practice and simulations
In practice, this optimal strategy can not be implemented within an order book. We therefore
consider a “discrete” version. In this version, we assume that the IB tries to keep her inventory
I equal to the optimal inventory Iˆ :=
∫ ·
0 ϑˆtdt − I◦. To do this, she fixes a time grid {ti, i ≤ n}
with t0 = 0 and tn = T . At time ti, she estimates that she has to execute a volume of Vi,i+1 :=∫ ti+1
ti
vˆ(t, Iti)dt on [ti, ti+1] while the volume of the market will be V˜i,i+1 =
∫ ti+1
ti
vtdt. Then, she
follows a volume strategy with threshold δI = +∞, see Section 5.1 above, on [ti, ti+1] with a target
participation rate of f = Vi,i+1/(V˜i,i+1 + Vi,i+1). When ∆I := I − I0 > Iˆ + δ¯I , for some δ¯I > 0,
orders are canceled and she waits until ∆I ≤ Iˆ + δ¯I . In the case where ∆I < Iˆ − δ¯I , she puts
market orders to reduce to the situation ∆I ≥ Iˆ − δ¯I as soon as possible.
For our numerical experiment, we take the same configuration as in Section 5.1, with δ¯I = 4,
i.e. 2 ATS. The optimization of the VWAP strategy is done with a time horizon of 30 minutes and
a flat volume curve (so that the control does in fact not depend on it). The number of units to buy
is I◦ = 250 units. The additional parameters13 are set to η = 1, σ = 0.2, β = 0, 0004, κ = 0.003
and κ˜ = κ∗60. The latter corresponds to the cost incurred when buying the remaining shares IT in
1 additional minute after T , at a flat intensity in the theoretical continuous time model of Section
5.2.1. The volume intensity v corresponds to 0.6 ATS per second, i.e. 1.2 units per second.
The interpretation of the different graphics in Figure 7 is the same as in Section 5.1, except
that the dashed lines in the top left graphic correspond now to the optimal VWAP trading curve
±2 ATS. Again, we see that only a limited number of market orders were needed to be sent, but
that the imbalance created by the VWAP trading algorithm drives the price up.
Figure 8 provides an histogram of the relative error (in %) of the VWAP obtained by this
strategy with respect to the VWAP of the whole market14. It is based on 104 simulated paths. One
can see that he actually typically performs better than the market. Not surprisingly, this strategy
performs better than the volume strategy in terms of VWAP.
13The coefficients β and κ are estimated for our book dynamic. Given priors with simulate a bunch of paths and
estimated them by a moment matching approach based on (5.2)-(5.3). We then use the updated values to simulate
a new bunch of paths and we re-estimate them. And so on, until convergence.
14Namely, (VWAPMM − VWAPMarket)/VWAPMarket, in which VWAPMM is the VWAP obtained by the IB by
playing his optimal VWAP strategy
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Figure 7: Simulated path of the VWAP strategy.
Percentage difference with the market VWAP
Figure 8: Histogram of the percentage error with respect to the VWAP of the market, for the
VWAP strategy.
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6 Simulation of the full market
We now provide an illustration of possible interactions of several market participants. Again, a
more realistic and general study is left for future research.
The prior and parameters of the participants are the same as the one that have been used in the
above numerical experiments. More precisely, we consider one MM, one HFT and four IB. Among
the IB, two are playing volume strategies (a buy and a sell) and two are playing WVAP strategies
(a buy and a sell). At each time step, each participant decides of his optimal control given the
current state of the order book. They send their orders at the same time. The control of the HFT
is executed first, then this is the turn of the MM, and finally the controls of the Volume and VWAP
trading algorithms are executed (we choose the order among them randomly, according to a uniform
distribution). Since the MM and the Volume and VWAP trading algorithms decide before seeing
the action of the HFT, their controls may not be applied or only partially, depending of the state of
the order book after the previous participants have played. The exogenous randomness only comes
from the simulation of the stock-futures spread process S and from the new queues created when
one queue is depleted. If the bid queue is depleted, then the bid price moves down. If the bid-ask
spread is equal to two ticks, then the ask price moves down as well. The other way round if the
ask queue is depleted. If the bid (resp. the ask) price moves down (resp. up), we consider that this
is a discovered limit and its size is chosen as in Section 3.4: 10 units with probability 60%, 5 units
with probability 25% and 12 units with probability 15%. If the bid (resp. the ask) price move up
(resp. down), which can happen if the bid-ask spread is already of two ticks, we consider that this
is a created limit and its size is chosen again as in Section 3.4: 2 units with probability 60%, 1 unit
with probability 25% and 3 units with probability 15%. There is no other randomness, the rest of
the dynamics is du to the HFT, the MM and the four other trading algorithms.
Note that only the VWAP trading algorithms are forced to trade, when they reach the (upper
or lower) limit of their prescribed inventory path. In principle, the MM plays aggressive orders
only when he needs to adjust quickly his inventory. For a typical path of the stock-futures spread,
the HFT also has no incentive to send aggressive orders, except to adjust his inventory. Without
trades, the Volume trading algorithms do not act as well (because the market volume does not
move). Therefore, if the MM and the HFT have a zero initial inventory, we expect to have to wait
for the VWAP trading algorithms to initiate first aggressive orders, and starts the whole dynamics.
In our illustration, we start with an initial state in which the HFT and the MM have a zero
initial inventory. Each VWAP trading algorithm has to buy/sell 75 stocks within 5 minutes of
trading. This corresponds to an average of 0.5 trades per second, which is consistent with the
priors of the MM and the HFT.
The Figures 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 have the same interpretation as in Section 3.4 except that
now the position of the agent in the queue is in blue in the top right and middle left graphics (the
black part corresponding to the other participants). The top right graphic is the state of the book
just after the control of the agent is executed, the middle left is the state of the order book after
the controls of all the participants have been executed. Note surprisingly, the trades are essentially
due to the VWAP trading algorithms, to which the Volume trading algorithms need to adjust.
The aggressive orders sent by the HFT and the MM are either cancellations or corrections of their
inventory near the terminal time, except around time 35 at which the HFT clearly wants to take
a position on the stock-futures spread because it is very low. Note that the first price jump is
due to an aggressive sell order of the HFT, slightly before time 275, which pushes the bid price
down. He just after sends a limit sell order in the spread, and the ask price moves down as well.
Since he is executed first and all players decide at the same time, he does not give to the others
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the opportunity to take this position in the spread. The last price move, just before T , is due to
the HFT and the MM. This time the HFT and the MM send aggressive buy orders that deplete
the queue (we do not see the price move on the graphics of the HFT, because they provide the
prices after the execution of the order of the agent). As in Section 4.5, his position follows the
stock-futures spread. In particular, between time 50 and 100, one can observe that he waits before
sending a new sell limit order because the spread is gone up and he wants to buy stocks to short-sell
the futures. When the spread starts going done, he takes a stronger position at the ask than at the
bid, to start selling back the stock. As for the MM, he finishes with an inventory equal to −1, that
will eventually be liquidated at 10.010, which explains the downward jump of his portfolio value at
T . When his inventory is very low, he balances between putting limit buy orders and letting the
price go down by not supporting the bid limit. It is not successful until the price eventually moves
down around time 275.
7 Conclusion
We have proposed a simplified but still realistic modeling of an order book, whose dynamics depends
on the current imbalance. We have derived optimal strategies for three key actors: Market Makers,
High Frequency Traders and Institutional Brokers (volume and VWAP trading algorithms). In this
model, optimal strategies can be estimated numerically. Simulations show how complex optimal
strategies are when actors believe that the imbalance actually has an impact on the dynamics of
order flows. Our numerical simulations show that the construction of a realistic market simulator
is feasible. A desirable next step would be to consider realistic proportions of market participants
for the simulations proposed in Section 6 and to see whether the market statistics used to calibrate
the different strategies can be retrieved through the simulated interactions of the various players.
If this is the case, one can imagine trying to exhibit different market patterns depending on the
nature and proportions of actors currently acting.
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Figure 9: Optimal strategy of the High Frequency Trader when agents play together.
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Figure 10: Optimal strategy of the Market Maker when agents play together.
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Figure 11: Optimal strategy of the Volume trading algorithm (seller) when agents play together.
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Figure 12: Optimal strategy of the Volume trading algorithm (buyer) when agents play together.
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Figure 13: Optimal strategy of the VWAP trading algorithm (seller) when agents play together.
37
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
−
3
−
2
−
1
0
1
2
3
Controls
Time
Bi
d | 
Ask
lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
−
10
−
5
0
5
10
Queues after Control
Time
Bi
d | 
Ask
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
llll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
llll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
llll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
llll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
llll
llll
lll
l
lll
llll
llllllllll
l
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
−
10
−
5
0
5
10
Queues after all participants
Time
Bi
d | 
Ask
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
llll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
llll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
llll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
llll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
llll
llll
lll
l
lll
llll
llllllllll
l
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
−
80
−
60
−
40
−
20
0
Inventory
Time
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
10
.00
6
10
.00
7
10
.00
8
10
.00
9
10
.01
0
Mean Price
Time
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
9.9
90
9.9
95
10
.00
0
10
.00
5
10
.01
0
Bid and Ask Price
Time
Bi
d | 
Ask
Figure 14: Optimal strategy of the VWAP trading algorithm (buyer) when agents play together.
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